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Abstract   
This paper examines the firm level determinants of the incidence of cross-licensing. It 
develops a simple stochastic theory explaining such incidence, and confirms its 
implications based on new dataset of licensing contracts by Japanese firms. Among 
major findings are: 
(1) Licensing probability has an almost linear relationship with the size of a potential 
licensor. 
(2) Cross-licensing is more prevalent between large and symmetric firms.   
(3) A licensing contract with only patents is more likely to involve cross-licensing than 
that with only trade secret. 
(4) A licensor is on the average larger than a licensee.   
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Technology licensing plays a very important role in innovations. It is an important 
mechanism for knowledge dissemination, and simultaneously it enhances the ex-ante 
incentive for R&D
i. It can also affect the division of labor in innovations by allowing an 
entry of a firm specialized in R&D (see Arora and Gambardella (2001)). Whether 
stronger IPRs promote or harm innovation may depend critically on whether stronger 
IPRs promote licensing or not
ii. Given this importance, licensing has attracted 
increasing research attentions in recent years. However, while there are many theoretical 
studies on licensing
iii, empirical work, especially those which have strong theoretical 
underpinnings, is still very scarce
iv. As a result, some of the basic structure of licensing 
contracts are still not well accounted for. 
This study aims at analyzing the firm level determinants of the incidence of a 
cross-license. In particular, it analyzes how it is related to firm size and the types of 
IPRs covered by a contract. It also inquires why a licensor tends to be larger than a 
licensee in observed licensing contracts. Existing theoretical literature tends to analyze 
unilateral licensing and cross-licensing separately and does not provide a guide for 
analyzing these basic questions. Existing empirical literature focuses mainly on 
inter-industry differences in the incidence of cross-licensing (See Anand and Khanna 
(2000) and Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (2001)), so that it has not systematically 
investigated how its variation within industry is determined. 
In this paper we will develop a simple stochastic theory explaining the 
incidence of cross licensing. We focus entirely on ex-post licensing behaviors. The 
theory is based on a simple assumption that the probability that a firm will seek a  3
license of a specific external technology is very small and that such probability is 
independent with each other across available external technologies. Although a very 
simple model, we can extract the following testable implications: (1) cross-licensing is 
more prevalent between large and symmetric firms, (2) a licensing contract with patents 
is more likely to involve cross-licensing than that with trade secrets, and (3) a licensor is 
on the average larger than a licensee.   
In order to test these implications, we need to have a database of licensing 
contracts matched with corporate information on both licensors and licensees. We have 
developed such database based on the corporate reports filed by the Japanese 
manufacturing firms in 1999FY under the Security Exchange Law. A substantial number 
of Japanese firms disclosed the existing licensing contracts that their management 
regarded to be important, complying with this legal requirement. We have found 
econometric evidence strongly supportive of the above implications, based on these 
dataset. 
The rest of the paper consists of the following. Section 2 provides the 
definitions and explanations of the database of licensing contracts which we have 
developed as well as the descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents a theoretical 
framework and testable implications. Section 4 presents the estimation results and 
discussions. Section 5 concludes.   
2.  Licensing contracts database   
Our sample is comprised of 1,144 licensing contracts, which were disclosed by 268 
Japanese manufacturing firms in their financial and corporate reports for 1998FY and 
for which the employment data of both licensor and licensee was available
v. These 
Japanese manufacturing firms were listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock  4
Exchange. The Security Exchange Law requires a publicly traded company to disclose 
important contracts for its business, which has encouraged many firms to disclose 
licensing contracts, although the coverage of the licensing contracts is far from being 
comprehensive. We have consolidated contracts reported by both a licensor and a 
licensee. 
  Table 1 shows the number of contracts and their composition by six industry 
sectors. It also shows the same set of information with respect to the sub-sample, for 
which the R&D data of both licensor and licensee are available. Industrial classification 
follows that of a reporting firm in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. We consolidate the 
industrial classification into the following five categories: chemicals (che), 
pharmaceuticals (pha), materials (mat), general machinery and transportation machinery 
(mac), electronics and electrical machinery (ele) and the other industries (oth). These six 
categories of industries are broadly defined based on technology characteristics
vi. The 
average incidence of cross-licensing is 8.5% for the entire sample, and it is 14.1% for 
the sub-sample with R&D data. The incidence of cross-licensing is higher for the 
sub-sample, primarily because R&D data is less available for the firms in developing 
countries and cross-licensing by a Japanese firm is much less frequent with these firms. 
Cross licensing is most extensive in electronics and electrical industry. 
(Table1) 
Table 2 shows the composition of licensing contracts by the relationship between the 
licensing partners, by the IPRs specified in a contract and by the nationality of the 
licensing partner. In this Table, we distinguish a licensing partner to be either 
independent from the reporting firm, its subsidiary, a related firm which is short of 
subsidiary
vii or its parent. We introduce four categories in the nationalities of the  5
licensing partners of Japanese firms: Japan, the USA, the other high-income OECD 
economies (HIO)
viii , and the rest of the countries. According to the Table, 
cross-licensing is most prevalent between independent firms. It is significantly more 
prevalent when a licensing contract covers only patents, although there exist cross 
licensing contracts with only know-how. Finally, it is most frequent in the licensing 
contracts with the US firms.       
(Table2) 
3. Theory and estimation framework   
3.1 Theory and testable implications 
We assume that licensing is entirely ex-post. Firm j has nj technologies. For simplicity, 
we assume that the probability that firm k will seek a license with respect to an external 
technology in the industry ( ) ( k n α ) is so small that the following condition is satisfied: 
         1 ) ( << j k n n α                                           ( 1 )  
In addition, such probability is assumed to be identical and independent across all 
technologies existing outside of firm k. Given these assumptions, the probability that 
firm k will seek a license from firm j with nj technologies is proportional to nj and is 
given by   
j k license n n j k p ) ( ) ( α = ←                                   ( 2 )  
, since we can ignore the higher order terms. The function  ) ( k n α  may or may not 
increase with n k. On the one hand a firm with a larger technology portfolio is more 
likely to have a technology substituting external technologies, but it would have larger 
scope of business on the other, which would in turn increase the necessity of using the 
technologies of the other firms.    6
Cross-licensing between firm j and k is going to take place only when each 
firm decides to use the technologies of the other firm. Assuming that the probability of a 
firm to use the technologies of another is independent, the probability that 
cross-licensing will take place between firm j and k is given by 
k j j k cr n n n n k j p ) ( ) ( ) , ( α α =                                     ( 3 )  
Licensing (either unilateral license or cross-license) will take place when one or both of 
the firms would decide to use the technologies of the other. Such probability is given by 
k j j k k j j k license n n n n n n n n k j p ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( α α α α − + =                   ( 4 )  
Given equations (3) and (4), the probability of cross-licensing conditional upon 
licensing is equal to the following: 
} ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( /{ ) ( ) ( ) sin ; , ( k j j k k j j k k j j k cr n n n n n n n n n n n n g licen k j p α α α α α α − + =   (5)  
Note that the above conditional probability is unaffected even if contracts are reported 
by either or both of the firms only with some probability (φ), as long as such probability 
is common between a cross-license and a unilateral license. It is convenient to rewrite 
equation (5) in the following manner: 
] 1 } ) ( /{ 1 } ) ( /{ 1 /[ 1 ) sin ; , ( − + = k j j k cr n n n n g licen k j p α α                      ( 6 )     
We can derive the following four propositions for empirical analysis, based on 
equations (5) and (6).   
If we double the level of α, the probability of cross-licensing quadruples as 
shown by equation (3), while that of licensing as a whole increases but short of 




The higher the probability of patent infringement for a given number of technologies, 
the higher is the conditional probability of cross-licensing. 
 
Proof: This is evident from equation (6), given that higher probability of patent 
infringement implies higher α.  
 
Thus, the more complementary the innovations of different firms are either in research 
or in the use of new technology, the more prevalent is cross-licensing. In addition, the 
expansion of the scope of patent protection would increase the conditional probability 
of cross-licensing. Furthermore, it also implies that trade secret results in less 
cross-licensing than patents, since trade secret does not provide an exclusive right to a 
firm owing it. That is, the use of an independently discovered technology does not result 
in the infringement in the case of trade secret, but it does in the case of a patent, 
although a firm may still wish to cross-license trade secret, in order to avoid duplication 
of research.   
  Similarly, the conditional probability of cross-licensing would increase with 
firm size when α is non-decreasing with firm size.   
 
Proposition 2 
If ) ( k n α is non-decreasing with nk, increasing the firm size of either a licensor or a 
licensee would increase the conditional probability of cross-licensing.   
 
Proof:  When such condition is satisfied, increasing the size of a firm would increase  8
either or both of  j k n n ) ( α and k j n n ) ( α . Then, equation (6) provides the result.     
  In the case of constantα , the probability of cross-license is larger when the 
firms are more symmetric. This is because we have   
) /( ) sin ; , ( k j k j k j cr n n n n n n g licen k j p α α − + =                ( 7 )  
a n d          2 / } ) ( ) {(
2 2
k j k j k j n n n n n n − − + = .  
A simple arithmetic example clarifies the logic of why the more symmetric the firm 
sizes are, the more prevalent is cross-licensing. If both firms find the probability of 
seeking a license from another firm to be 10%, the conditional probability of 
cross-licensing among such pair of firms is equal to 5%. However, if one of the firms 
finds the probability of seeking a license to be 19% and the other to be 1%, the 
conditional probability of cross-licensing is equal to only 1%. Thus, the asymmetry of 
the size of the firms reduces the probability of cross-licensing. More generally, we have 
the following proposition, including the case where the α function is not constant.   
 
Proposition 3 
Any small deviation from symmetry in firm size reduces the conditional probability of 
cross-licensing.  
Proof: See appendix 2 
 
In the following, we assume that  ) ( k n α has a linear relation with nk, so that   
j k license n n j k p ) 1 ( ) ( 0 θ α + = ←                              ( 8 ) ,  
where θ is a parameter. In this case, the probability of a license from a potential licensor 
j to a potential licensee k depends on the size of a potential licensor j and on the  9
multiple of the sizes of the two firms. Since the size of a licensee affects the probability 
of licensing only through the cross-term with the size of a licensor, we have the 
following proposition.   
 
Proposition 4 
The expected size of a licensor is larger than that of a licensee in unilateral licensing 
contracts, if equation (8) holds.   
 
Proof: For any pair of firm j  and k, the expected size of a licensor (a licensee) is 
respectively given by   
k cr k j j cr j k licensor n k j p n n n k j p n n Size } ) , ( ) 1 ( { } ) , ( ) 1 ( { − + + − + = θ α θ α ,         
and 
j cr k j k cr j k licensee n k j p n n n k j p n n Size } ) , ( ) 1 ( { } ) , ( ) 1 ( { − + + − + = θ α θ α         
The above equations immediately suggest that the expected size of a licensor is larger 
than that of a licensee for any pair of firms, since 
0 ) (
2 ≥ − = − k j licensee licensor n n Size Size α                                  ( 9 )  
Thus, generally, the expected size of a licensor is larger than that of a licensee in 
unilateral licensing contracts. (QED) 
 
Note that the above inequality is reversed if the probability of a license from a 
licensor j to a licensee k is proportional to the size of a licensee k rather than to the size 
of a licensor j (that is, if we have k j
Al
license n n j k p ) 1 ( ) ( 0 θ α + = ← ). Consequently, the 
above proposition provides a test discriminating the assumption (8) from the above  10
alternative assumption. Such test is important, since the two assumptions are 
observationally equivalent in determining the conditional probability of cross-licensing 
(i.e. implying the identical equation (5)), even though the alternative assumption does 
not have a good theoretical basis. 
  For the purpose of providing a tractable analytical framework for directly 
estimating the determinants of conditional probability, we further assume that, 
          1 << k n θ                                              ( 1 0 ) .  
It says that the size of a licensee does not significantly affect the probability that it 
receives a license
ix. Given the assumptions of (1), (8) and (10), equations (5) can be 
approximated by the following manner:   
)} /( ) )}{( /( { ) /( ) sin ; , (
2 2
0 0 k j j k k j j k k j j k cr n n n n n n n n n n n n g licen k j p + + + + + ≅ θ α α  (11). 
This equation can be used to provide estimates of  0 α  and  θ of equation (8).   
3.2 Framework of estimation   
In order to test the above theoretical propositions we estimate the following two 
equations for the conditional probability of cross-licensing. First, we estimate directly 
equation (11):   
region industry
j k j k cr
controls controls both
opat related B A g licen k j p
+ + +
+ + + + =
) (
) ( ) ( ) sin ; , (
5
4 3 , 2 , 1 0
β
β β β β β
     ( 1 2 )                 
, where  ) /( , k j j k j k n n n n A + =  and ) /( ) ( A B
2 2
j k, j k, k j j k n n n n + + = . We estimate this linear 
probability model by OLS, using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The 
coefficients of Ak,j and Bk,j in equation (12) give the estimates of the parameters of α 
function:  0 1 α β =  and  θ α β 0 2 = . We expect that   1 β  is positive, but  2 β  can be 
either positive or negative. Since equation (12) depends on the linear approximation of  11
equation (5), we also estimate the Probit model with the following latent variable. This 
specification incorporates the implications of the propositions 2 and 3 into independent 
variables: cross-licensing is more prevalent between large and symmetric firms, 
region industry
j k j k cr
controls controls both opat
related arn mn g licen k j latent
+ + + +
+ + + =
) ( ) (
) ( ) sin ; , (
5 4
3 , 2 , 1 0
δ δ
δ δ δ δ
      ( 1 3 )  
In equation (13),  } 2 / ) ln{( , j k j k n n mn + =  gives the logarithm of the average firm size 
and  | ) / ln( | , j k j k n n arn = gives the absolute value of the logarithm of the relative firm 
size. We expect a positive  1 δ  and a negative 2 δ , from propositions 2 and 3. We 
measure the size of firms ( j k n n , ) both in terms of employment (eml, the unit of which is 
10,000) and R&D (rd, the unit of which is 1 Billion US$). Thus, Ak,j in equation (12) 
(mnk,j in equation (13)) is respectively given by  ) /( , k j j k j k eml eml eml eml Aeml + =  
( } 2 / ) ln{( , j k j k eml eml meml + = ).  
The rest of the variables are common for equation (12) and (13). The dummy 
variable  related  indicates whether the licensing relation involves a related firm, 
covering three cases (a licensee is a subsidiary, a related firm short of subsidiary or a 
parent firm of a licensor). Although not directly implied by the above theory, it seems to 
be reasonable to expect that cross-license is less prevalent for the licensing relationship 
with a related firm. This is because the efficient coordination of R&D within the group 
of related firms would result in the allocation of R&D tasks in such a manner that the 
R&D tasks with higher interdependency would be internalized within a single firm, 
while the R&D tasks with only unilateral dependency could be divided between 
different firms within a group. Thus, cross-licensing would be rare in licensing contracts  12
involving a related firm, since the R&D coordination within a firm would make 
(ex-post) cross-licensing unnecessary. The dummy variable opat indicates whether the 
licensing contract covers only patents or not. The dummy variable both indicates 
whether the contract covers both patents and know-how. Thus, the base of estimation is 
a contract with only know-how. Proposition 1 would imply that the incidence of 
cross-licensing would be higher for a contract with only patents than that with only 
know-how: opat has a positive sign. Thus, the theoretical predictions are that:  3 β ( 3 δ ) 
are negative and  4 β ( 4 δ ) are positive.   
   As for control variables, we introduce five industry dummies and four 
regional variables (including three dummies). The function α(nk) would depend 
significantly upon the nature of technology. Such probability would be high in those 
industries where technological interdependency among firms in either production or 
research is high. We capture such effects by industry dummies with electrical and 
electronics industry as the base. We use the following five dummies: che for chemical 
industry, pha for pharmaceutical industry, mat for material industry, mac for machinery 
industry and oth for the other industry. We expect negative coefficients for these 
dummies, since past studies suggest that technological interdependency among firms is 
the highest in electrical and electronics industry (See Anand and Khanna (2000)).   
The regional variables control the regional variations in the relationship 
between the proxy of firm size (employment size and R&D expenditure) and the 
number of technologies (n). For a given level of n, firm size would vary, depending on 
the difference in the degree of vertical integration, factor prices, the composition of 
R&D and the other unaccounted-for factors across nations. We control these differences 
by the GNP per capita of a country with that of Japan as the basis (gnpgap, the unit of  13
which is 10,000 US$) in which a licensing partner exists, and three regional dummies: 
jusa for a licensing with a US firm, jhio for a licensing with a firm in high-income 
OECD countries excluding Japan and the USA, and a dummy joth for a licensing with a 
firm in the other countries. Thus the base of estimation is a domestic licenses. See 
Appendix 3 for a summary statistics of the variables.   
Let us turn to Proposition 4 on the relative size of a licensor in unilateral 
licensing. It suggests the following equation for the size of a licensor relative to that of a 
licensee.  
) 4
3 2 1 0
(Re




gion lsorsub lsorpar n n
β
β β β β
+
+ + + =
  ( 1 4 )            
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the size of employment or research 
expenditure of a licensor divided by that of a licensee ( ) / ln( k j n n  = rem or rrd). As for 
the independent variables, lsorpar is a dummy for the contract in which a licensor is a 
parent company and the licensee is either a subsidiary or a related firm short of a 
subsidiary. Lsorsub, on the other hand, indicates a situation where a licensee is a parent 
company and the licensor is a subsidiary firm. A subsidiary is often smaller than a 
parent firm, since the parent firm provides managerial and supporting services to a 
subsidiary. Thus, we expect that lsorpar (lsorsub) has a positive (negative) coefficient. 
Regional variables control the regional difference of firm sizes, reflecting the difference 
in the degree of vertical integration, factor prices and the others. We use the same set of 
regional dummies as above for both a licensor and a licensee. Proposition 4 suggests 
that we have a significantly positive estimate for 0 β , since  0 0 = β  implies that the 
licensor has the same size as the licensee on the average.   
  14
4  Estimation results 
4.1 Conditional probability of cross-licensing 
Table 3 provides four estimation results when we measure the size of a firm by its 
employment. The first and second estimations are based on the linear probability model 
(12) and the rest are based on the latent variable model (13). While the first and the third 
estimation use the variable (related) as an independent variable, the second and fourth 
estimations use the IPR variables (opat and both) as independent variables. Since only 
half of the sample firms report IPR information, the size of the sample is significantly 
reduced for these estimations. We cannot use the two set of variables simultaneously, 
since there are no cross-licensing contracts with a related firm in the smaller sample 
with information on IPR. Thus, estimation 2 and 4 use only the contracts between 
independent firms as the sample. 
                              ( T a b l e   3 )  
  Estimation results provide strong supports to the theoretical model in the above 
section. Almost all estimated coefficients have expected signs and most of them are 
highly statistically significant, although the explanatory power of the equations is not 
very high (R
2 is 0.18 for estimation 1 and 0.28 for estimation 3). The coefficients of 
Aeml in equation 1 and 2, which provide the estimate of 0 α , are statistically significant 
at 1%. They imply that the probability of a firm seeking a license from another firm is 
5.5% (or 5.9%) when the latter is of the employment size of 10,000 persons. On the 
other hand, the coefficient estimates of Beml are statistically insignificant, so that we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that  θ   is zero. According to the estimate (see the last row 
of Table 3), 10,000 increase of the employment size reduces such probability only by 
1.7% (or 2.1%). Thus, a licensing probability has an almost linear relationship with the  15
size of a potential licensor. Estimations 3 and 4 clearly show that cross-licensing is more 
prevalent between large and symmetric firms in employment size, fully consistent with 
the above results from estimations 1 and 2. The average size of the firms (meml) has a 
highly significant positive coefficient, and the relative size of the firms in the absolute 
terms (areml) has a highly significant negative coefficient in both equations, each at 1% 
level.  
Turning to the effects of the variables rel, opat and both, estimation 1 shows 
that the dummy for a subsidiary and related firm (rel) has a highly significant negative 
coefficient, consistent with a theoretical consideration, although the coefficient is not 
significant in estimation 3. The dummy for a contract with only patent (opat) has a 
significant positive coefficient in estimation, consistent with our theoretical prediction. 
It has a positive but insignificant coefficient in estimation 4. The dummy for a contract 
with both patent and know-how (both) has a negative coefficient, although not 
significant.  
Let us turn to control variables. All industry dummies, except for that of the 
other industries (oth), have negative coefficients, showing that cross-licensing is most 
prevalent in electrical and electronics industry. The negative coefficients are large and 
highly significant for pharmaceutical industry and material industry in all estimations. 
In these two industries innovations of firms are much less interdependent among firms 
than in electrical and electronics industry. As for regional variables, the dummy for the 
licensing contract with the firms in the USA has a highly significant positive coefficient 
in all estimations, while the other dummies are not significant. The gap of GNP per 
capita from that of Japan (gnpgap) has an insignificant coefficient. Since its coefficient 
is small and the GNP per capita gap between Japan and the USA is small (0.3 in favor of  16
Japan), the estimation results, including those of estimation 1 and 3 with a positive 
coefficient for gnpgap, shows that the interdependency of innovations is more 
significant between Japanese and US firms than between Japanese firms in terms of the 
incidence of cross-licensing
x.  
Table 4 provides the results of estimation when we measure the size of firm by 
R&D (rd). They are based on a more limited sample of the firms, for which R&D data is 
available, and use the same models as for Table 3. The results are highly consistent with 
those in Table 3. The coefficients of Ard in equation 1 and 2, which provide the estimate 
of 0 α , are statistically significant at 1%. They indicate that the probability of 
licensing-in by a firm with a potential licensor with 100 M$ R&D budget is 5.6%. The 
coefficient estimates of Brd are statistically insignificant, as before. Thus, a licensing 
probability has an almost linear relationship with the size of a licensor. Estimations 3 
and 4 show that cross-licensing is clearly more prevalent between large and symmetric 
firms in terms of R&D. The patent variable (opat), an industry dummy (pha) and the 
regional dummy (jusa) have significant coefficients either at 1% or 5%
xi, except for jusa 
in estimation 4.   
   ( T a b l e   4 )  
4.2 The size of a licensor relative to that of a licensee in unilateral contracts 
Table 5 shows the estimation results for equation (14), with and without regional control 
dummies. The first and second estimations use the logarithm of employment (eml) to 
measure the size of a firm, while the third and fourth estimations use the logarithm of 
R&D (rd) to measure the size of a firm. As shown as estimation 1, the average relative 
size of a licensor adjusting the parent and subsidiary relationship is 1.29 in the 
logarithmic term (or 3.65 in the absolute term) and is significantly larger than zero at  17
1% level. As expected, the parent dummy (lsorpar) for a licensor has a significant and 
positive sign (i.e. the parent firm is significantly larger than a subsidiary). Similarly, the 
subsidiary & related firm dummy (lsorsub) for a licensor has a significant and negative 
coefficient. 
                              ( T a b l e   5 )  
Estimation 2 adds regional dummies to control international differences in the 
degree of vertical integration, relative factor prices and other non-accounted-for factors. 
The parent dummy (lsorpar) for a licensor has a significant and positive sign and the 
subsidiary & related firm dummy (lsorsub) for a licensor has a significant and negative 
coefficient, as in estimation 1. The estimated average size of a licensor relative to that of 
a licensee for domestic licensing between independent firms is again positive and highly 
significant. It is 3.00 in the absolute terms. The dummy representing high income 
OECD countries (excluding the USA) has a positive and significant coefficient when it 
refers to a licensor status (lsorhio), and a negative coefficient when it refers to a licensee 
status (lseehio). On the other hand, the GNP per capita variable has a negative and 
significant coefficient when it refers to a licensor status (lsorgnpgap), and a positive 
coefficient when it refers to a licensor status (lsorgnpgap). The coefficients of these 
variables indicate that a Japanese firm, both as a licensor and as a licensee, is smaller 
than a firm in the other high income OECD countries
xii. The dummy representing the 
other countries has a negative and significant coefficient when it refers to a licensor 
status (lsoroth), and a positive and significant coefficient when it refers to a licensee 
status (lseeoth). The coefficients of these variables indicate that the firms in lower in 
come countries tend to be smaller in size than a Japanese firm. The estimation 3 and 4, 
which are based on R&D, provide the results largely consistent with these results. The  18
estimated average size of a licensor relative to that of a licensee for domestic licensing 
between independent firms is 4.2 according to estimation 3 (and 3.7 according to 
estimation 4) in the absolute term. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has examined how firm size and the IPRs specified in the contracts can 
explain the incidence of cross licensing. We have developed a simple stochastic theory 
explaining the conditional probability of cross license, and derived implications on the 
incidence of cross-license as well as on the relative size of a licensor. We have tested 
these implications, based on newly collected dataset of licensing contracts by Japanese 
firms.  
The major findings are the following: 
(1) Licensing probability has an almost linear relationship with the size of a potential 
licensor (employment or R&D). The size of a potential licensee does not affect such 
probability (negatively if any).   
(2) A theory suggests that the conditional probability of cross-licensing increases with 
the sizes of a licensor and a licensee as well as with their symmetry, given that 
cross-licensing depends on the matching of double wants. The empirical evidence 
strongly supports this implication.     
(3) A theory suggests that the incidence of cross-licensing is higher for a contract with a 
patent right than that with trade secret, since patent is an exclusive right unlike trade 
secret. We found evidence strongly supportive of this implication: a licensing contract 
covering only patents is found to involve cross-licensing significantly more frequently.   
(4) We also found that the incidence of cross-licensing is larger for a licensing between  19
Japanese and US firms than that among Japanese firms. It suggests that innovations are 
more interdependent between Japanese and US firms than among Japanese firms. 
(5) A licensor is on the average significantly larger than a licensee in terms of 
employment and R&D, which supports our theoretical assumption that the size of a 
potential licensor is the primary determinant of the licensing probability.    20
Appendix 1 (Data sources) 
The employment and R&D data of the Japanese firms located in Japan are drawn from 
NEEDS (Nikkei Economic Electronic Database System). The employment of Japanese 
firms is based on a consolidated account, so as to improve the international 
comparability of data. The employment and R&D data of foreign firms are collected 
from the World Scope database. All of these data belong to 1998FY. In order to obtain 
R&D data in a common base in US $, we converted the national currency data by PPP 
exchange rate in 1998CY as reported by the World Development Indicators (2000) of 
the World Bank. The employment data of the foreign subsidiaries and related firms of 
the Japanese firms are from Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran (Japanese Overseas 
Investment) of Toyo-Keizai.   
 
Appendix 2 (Proof of proposition 3) 
Consider the following deviation from a symmetric firm size:  ) 1 ( ∆ + = n n j  and 
) 1 ( ∆ − = n nk . In this case, we have 
) )( }( ' ) ( }{ ' ) ( { ) , ( ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + = n n n n n n n n n k j p cr α α α α  
] } 1 ) / ' {( 1 [ ) }( ) ' ( {
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ∆ + − ≅ ∆ − ∆ − = α α α α α n n n n n  
) )( ' ( ) )( ' ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) , ( ∆ − ∆ + + ∆ + ∆ − = + = + n n n n n n n n n n k j p k j p k j j k cr license α α α α α α  
} ) / ' ( 1 { 2
2 ∆ − ≅ α α α n n 
Thus, we have 
] } 1 / ' ) / ' {( 1 [ 2 / ) sin ; , (
2 2 ∆ + − − ≅ α α α α α n n n g licen k j p cr  
Since the bracketed term in front of 
2 ∆   is positive, the conditional probability of cross 
licensing declines as ∆ increases in the absolute term.  21
Acknowledgment: 
Nagaoka would like to thank Ryoko Enomoto, Ishikawa Tomohisa and Zhang Shu Zhen for their 
excellent research assistance in constructing the licensing contracts database. We would like to thank 
for the comments by Hiroyuki Chuma, Hiroyuki Odagiri, Isao Ohashi, Katsuhide Isa and the other 






Anand, B.N and T. Khana, 2000, “The structure of licensing contracts,” Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 48, pp. 103-135 
 
Arora A., A. Fosfuri and A. Gambardella, 2001, Markets for Technology, MIT Press 
 
Besen J. and E. Maskin, 2002, “Sequential innovation, patents and imitation,” Paper no. 
25, Economic Working Paper, School of Social Sciences 
 
Caves, R., Crookell, H. and Killing, P.J., 1983, “The Imperfect Market for Technology 
Licenses,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 45, pp. 249-267 
 
Eswaran M, 1993, “Cross-licensing of competing patents as a facilitating device,” 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 107, pp. 689-708 
 
Fershtman C. and M. I. Kamien, 1992, “Cross licensing of complementary 
technologies,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 10, pp. 329-348 
 
Gallini N. T. and R. A. Winter, 1985, “Licensing in the theory of innovation,” Rand 
Journal of Economics, 16, pp. 237-252   
 
Gallini, N. and Wright, B., 1990, “Technology Transfer Under Asymmetric 
Information,” Rand Journal of Economics, 21, pp. 147-160   
 
Galini, N. and S. Scotchmer, 2002, “Intellectual property: when is it the best incentive 
system?” in Innovation and the Economy (edited by A. B. Jaffe, J. Lerner and S. Stern), 
Vol. 2, MIT Press 
 
Guifang Yang and K.E. Maskus, 2001, “Intellectual property rights, licensing, and 
innovation in an endogenous product-cycle model,” Journal of International Economics, 
53, pp. 169-187   
 
Helpman, E., 1993, “Innovation, imitation and intellectual property rights,” 
Econometrica, 61, pp. 1247-1280 
 
Kamien M. and Y. Tauman, 1986, “Fees vs. Royalties and the Private value of a patent,”  23
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, pp. 471-492 
 
Kamien M.S. S. Oren and Y. Tauman, 1992, “Optimal Licensing of Cost-reducing 
innovation,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 21, pp. 483-508 
 
Katz M. L. and C. Shapiro, 1985, “On the licensing of innovations,” Rand Journal of 
Economics, 16, pp. 504-520 
 
Katz M. L. and C. Shapiro, 1986, “How to license intangible property,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 101, pp. 567-589 
 
Shapiro, C. 2000, “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard-setting,” in Innovation and the Economy (edited by A. B. Jaffe, J. Lerner and S. 
Stern), Vol. 1, MIT Press 
 
Taylor, C. and Silberston, Z., 1973, The Economic Impact of the Patent System: A Study 
of the British Experience, Cambridge University Press  24
 
                                                  
i  Licensing may also be used strategically to lower the incentive of a competitor to invent around the 
initial innovation (see Gallini and Winter (1985)). 
ii  See Gallini and Scotchmer (2002) and Besen and Maskin (2000) in the domestic context. See 
Helpman (1993) and Yang and Maskus (2001) in the international context. 
iii  See Gallini and Winter (1985, 1990), Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986), Kamien and Tauman (1986), 
Fershtman and Kamien (1992), Eswaran (1993), and Shapiro (2000). 
iv There are not many empirical studies of licensing. Exceptions are Taylor and Silberston (1973), 
Caves, Crookell and Killing (1983), Anand and Khanna (2000) and Arora and Gambardella (2001).   
v  See the appendix 1 for the sources of employment and R&D data. 
vi  We have chosen to classify industries in the following manner. The chemical industry (che) in this 
paper covers not only a narrowly defined chemical industry, but also petroleum, pulp & paper and 
textile industries. Since licensing contracts by the textile industry often involves licensing of 
chemical process, we have chosen to consolidate textile industry and chemical industry. On the other 
hand, we analyze pharmaceutical industry independently, since product technology is much more 
important in this industry. Material industry (mat) covers glass & stone, steel, non-ferrous metal and 
metal products industries. Machinery industry (mac) covers general machinery and transportation 
machinery industries. Electronics and electrical machinery industry (ele) covers a narrowly defined 
electronics and electrical machinery industry as well as precision machinery industry.   
vii  Typically, a (licensor) firm has more than 50% of the ownership stake on the licensee in the case 
of subsidiary, and it has less than or equal to 50% of the ownership stake but more than or equal to 
20% of the stake in the case of a related firm. 
viii  High-income OECD economies are those in which 1998 GNP per capita was $9,361 or more, and 
are the members of the OECD. Our classification of development level follows that of World 
Development Indicators (2000).   
ix  This assumption may be justified by the fact that the size of a licensee has two effects on the 
licensing probability which are offsetting each other. We will see whether the empirical findings are 
consistent with such assumption. 
x  One interpretation of such pattern is that a US firm plays a hub as a supplier of the basic 
technology for Japanese firms and it also requires a grant-back condition in its licensing to the latter.   
xi The  variable  (rel) is dropped in estimation 2 and 4 in Table 4, since there are no cross-licensing 
contracts with subsidiary or related firms in the sub-sample with R&D data, as in the case of Table 3. 
xii  The average gnpgap is -0.83 for high-income OECD countries and -2.73 for the other countries. 
Thus, the licensor belonging to high-income OECD countries is larger than a Japanese licensor by 
1.43 (=0.88-0.66*(-0.83)), and the licensee belonging to high-income OECD countries is larger than  25
                                                                                                                                                  





 Chemicals (che) 68(46) 294(111) 3.4(7.2)
Pharmaceuticals (pha) 22(20) 108(87) 1.9(2.3)
Materials (mat) 34(19) 139(50) 2.9(6.0)
General and transportation machinery (mac) 55(27) 183(57) 3.3(8.8)
Electrical and electronics (ele) 72(53) 371(244) 19.1(24.6)
Other (oth) 17(8) 49(19) 8.2(10.5)
Total 268(173) 1144(568) 8.5(14.1)
Table1 Number and composition of licensing contracts by Sectors




































848 210 62 11 391 109 108 263 378 174 329
Cross licensing 96 1 0 0 75 2 6 16 67 10 4
Cross licensing, % 11.32% 0.48% 0.00% 0.00% 19.18% 1.83% 5.56% 6.08% 17.72% 5.75% 1.22%
Table2   Number and composition of licensing contracts by firm relation/IPR/nationality
Licensing






choice Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err.
Aeml 0.0553 0.0179 *** 0.0585 0.0208 *** meml 0.2568 0.0624 *** 0.2813 0.0838 ***
Beml -0.0009 0.0007 -0.0012 0.0008 areml -0.1793 0.0429 *** -0.1938 0.0517 ***
rel -0.0355 0.0107 *** rel  -0.6769 0.4142
opat 0.0981 0.0394 ** opat 0.2949 0.2688
both -0.0229 0.0324 both -0.8007 0.4393 *
che -0.0643 0.0230 *** -0.0452 0.0336 che -0.3253 0.2032 -0.0836 0.2751
pha -0.1047 0.0242 *** -0.1281 0.0326 *** pha -0.9488 0.3401 *** -1.0052 0.4663 **
mat -0.0824 0.0234 *** -0.0953 0.0356 *** mat -0.6353 0.2742 ** -0.6817 0.3467 **
mac -0.0813 0.0248 *** -0.0547 0.0463 mac -0.5633 0.2367 ** -0.2209 0.3435
oth -0.0321 0.0446 0.0679 0.0773 oth -0.0530 0.3093 0.5230 0.3768
jusa 0.0967 0.0245 *** 0.1435 0.0346 *** jusa 0.6491 0.1889 *** 0.6051 0.2475 **
jhio 0.0006 0.0247 -0.0082 0.0343 jhio 0.0890 0.3021 -0.2727 0.4593
joth 0.0251 0.0282 0.0430 0.0581 joth 0.6475 0.7808 -0.2444 1.3246
gnpgap 0.0029 0.0071 -0.0131 0.0123 gnpgap 0.2922 0.3089 -0.2500 0.5056
cons 0.0677 0.0229 *** -0.0162 0.0448 cons -1.2126 0.1889 *** -1.5237 0.3136 ***
-0.0169 -0.0212
Table 3. Estimates of conditional probablity of cross-licensing based on employment
OLS estimation of linear probability model Probit estimation of the latent variable model
Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4
  Number of obs =    1131  Number of obs   =        608  Number of obs   =       1131 Number of obs   =        608
F( 12,  1118) =    10.25 F( 12, 595) = 8.02  LR chi2(12)     =     185.23   LR chi2(12)     =     128.63
 R-squared     =   0.1764   R-squared = 0.1889 Log likelihood = -238.35  Log likelihood =  -178.02
Note: *** significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and *significant at 10% level







choice Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err.
Ard 0.5629 0.1863 *** 0.5575 0.1973 *** mrd 0.1765 0.0541 *** 0.1457 0.0748 *
Brd -0.0295 0.0550 -0.0428 0.0584 arrd -0.1512 0.0406 *** -0.1973 0.0501 ***
rel -0.0231 0.0197 rel 
opat 0.1393 0.0626 ** opat 0.8297 0.3967 **
both 0.0156 0.0723 both -0.1523 0.5256
che -0.0563 0.0362 -0.0506 0.0462 che -0.3436 0.2323 -0.5396 0.3618
pha -0.1444 0.0289 *** -0.1528 0.0362 *** pha -1.2982 0.3443 *** -1.4990 0.4788 ***
mat -0.0681 0.0415 * -0.0657 0.0563 mat -0.6789 0.3342 ** -0.6963 0.3695 *
mac -0.0750 0.0448 * 0.0701 0.1044 mac -0.6014 0.2801 ** 0.0941 0.4148
oth -0.0247 0.0721 0.0884 0.0992 oth -0.2789 0.4318 0.1156 0.5208
jusa 0.1317 0.0395 *** 0.1457 0.0460 *** jusa 1.0412 0.2555 *** -0.2547 0.5665
jhio 0.0025 0.0567 -0.0447 0.0385 jhio 0.4400 0.4049 -3.0024 1.3919 **
joth 0.0092 0.1898 -0.0767 0.1436 joth
gnpgap 0.0114 0.0779 -0.0669 0.0566 gnpgap 0.3422 0.4645 -4.2079 1.6622 **
cons 0.0629 0.0275 ** -0.0516 0.0578 cons -0.8323 0.2169 *** -1.4300 0.4406 ***
-0.0523 -0.0767
Note: *** significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level and *significant at 10% level
Table 4. Estimates of conditional probablity of cross-licensing based on R&D expenditures
OLS estimation of linear probability model Probit estimation of the latent variable model
Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4
  Number of obs =     567  Number of obs =     376  Number of obs   =        555  Number of obs   =        375
F( 12,   554) =   12.27 F( 13,   362) =    9.60  LR chi2(10)     =      98.48 LR chi2(12)     =     102.68
R-squared     =  0.2275  R-squared     =  0.2564 Log likelihood = -179.65  Log likelihood = -127.69 














lsopar 2.082 0.129 *** 1.818 0.188 *** lsopar -0.638 2.383 1.618 0.907 *
lsorsub -3.609 0.166 *** -4.136 0.366 *** lsorsub
lsorusa -0.455 0.283 lsorusa 0.501 0.428
lsorhio 0.877 0.279 *** lsorhio 2.747 0.688 ***
lsoroth -4.549 0.752 *** lsoroth
lsorgnpgap -0.657 0.309 ** lsorgnpgap -0.340 0.931
lseeusa -0.440 0.305 lseeusa -2.607 0.441 ***
lseehio -0.654 0.399 * lseehio -4.167 0.368 ***
lseeoth 0.912 0.384 ** lseeoth -2.130 0.765 ***
lseegnpgap -0.013 0.120 lseegnpgap 0.076 0.295
cons 1.294 0.097 *** 1.099 0.162 *** cons 1.441 0.144 *** 1.298 0.201 ***
exp(cons) 3.649 3.001 4.224 3.664
Table 5. Estimation results for the size of a licensor relative to a licensee in unilateral licensing
Table5-A Based on Employment Table5-B Based on R&D expenditures 
Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4
 Number of obs   =       1047  Number of obs =    1047  Number of obs =     488  Number of obs =     488
F(  2,  1044) =  652.54 F( 10,  1036) =   25.68 F(  1,   486) =    0.07 F(  8,   479) =   65.31
R-squared = 0.1378   R-squared     =  0.1986 R-squared     =  0.0002  R-squared     =  0.3347
乯瑥㨠⨪⨠獩杮楦楣慮琠慴‱┠汥癥氬‪⩳楧湩晩捡湴⁡琠㔥⁬敶敬⁡湤 ‪獩杮楦楣慮琠慴‱〥⁬敶敬
 Root MSE       =    2.4327 Root MSE      =  2.3544   Root MSE      =  3.1673 Root MSE      =  2.6025Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
choice 1144 0.0848 0.2787 0 1
reml 1047 1.7899 2.6174 -7.3752 9.8686
rrd 488 1.4381 3.1643 -7.5609 9.3859
Independent Variables
Aeml 1144 1.0225 2.1704 0.0002 16.7037
Beml 1144 16.8987 53.2348 0.0000 558.3663
Ard 568 0.1378 0.2543 0.0001 1.4030
Brd 568 0.3482 0.8427 0.0000 5.4274
meml 1144 0.3241 1.7010 -5.1413 3.5091
areml 1144 2.5530 1.7427 0.0066 9.8686
mrd 568 -1.0646 1.7618 -6.9861 3.0460
arrd 568 2.8142 1.9461 0.0186 9.3859
rel 1131 0.2502 0.4333 0 1
opat 608 0.6431 0.4795 0 1
both 608 0.1776 0.3825 0 1
jj 1144 0.2299 0.4209 0 1
jusa 1144 0.3304 0.4706 0 1
jhio 1144 0.1521 0.3593 0 1
joth 1144 0.2876 0.4528 0 1
gnpgap 1144 -0.9352 1.1271 -3.2000 0.7630
ele 1144 0.3243 0.4683 0 1
che 1144 0.2570 0.4372 0 1
pha 1144 0.0944 0.2925 0 1
mat 1144 0.1215 0.3269 0 1
mac 1144 0.1600 0.3667 0 1
oth 1144 0.0428 0.2026 0 1
lsorpar 1047 0.2512 0.4339 0 1
lsorsub 1047 0.0076 0.0871 0 1
lsorusa 1047 0.1767 0.3816 0 1
lsorhio 1047 0.0898 0.2860 0 1
lsoroth 1047 0.0010 0.0309 0 1
lsorgnpgap 1047 -0.1150 0.2368 -2.3750 0.7630
lseeusa 1047 0.1203 0.3255 0 1
lseehio 1047 0.0669 0.2499 0 1
lseeoth 1047 0.3095 0.4625 0 1
lseegnpgap 1047 -0.8719 1.2168 -3.2000 0.7630
Appendix 3. Summary statistics